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1. Summary  
As governments around the world seek to respond rapidly and appropriately to the impacts of 
COVID-19, it can be beneficial to look back at responses to similar global systemic shocks. This 
can reveal relevant lessons, ranging from public health measures to policies for reducing the 
economic costs. This rapid literature review looks at lessons learned from efforts to mitigate the 
negative economic impacts of prior epidemics and the COVID-19 pandemic, and financial crises. 
The focus is on inclusive growth measures and geographically on middle-income countries, 
although lessons are also drawn from and applicable to lower- and higher-income countries. 
These secondary economic impacts are explained in detail in a companion paper (Lucas, 2020), 
which provides a breakdown of impacts, by industry/sector, type of shock, and affected 
demographic.   
As discussed in a prior literature review on evidence and lessons learned to mitigate the 
secondary impact of disease outbreaks (Kelly, 2020), there is limited robust evidence on 
responses to the secondary effects. While, there is a range of literature to draw upon that 
discusses interventions to mitigate the economic impacts of epidemics and financial crises and 
lessons learned, they rarely extend to quantitative findings or to clear attribution of measures to 
specific outcomes. This report nonetheless reveals useful lessons from prior disease outbreaks 
and financial crises to address the negative economic impacts of COVID-19 disruptions and to 
promote inclusive growth. Policy and programme interventions fall under: health and 
preparedness; monetary policy and support to the financial sector; and fiscal policy and social 
protection. It is important that policies and programmes are carefully designed to mitigate 
immediate and short-term impacts with a view to promoting, or at a minimum, not undermining 
longer-term economic recovery. Where possible, this complementarity or tension between the 
short- and long-term is noted in the various interventions discussed in this paper. 
Health and economics 
Investing in health capacity and pandemic preparedness is one of the most productive 
investments for health and for inclusive economic growth (WHO, 2016; Brahmbhatt and Jonas, 
2015). It can not only mitigate the disastrous health impacts of epidemics and pandemics, but 
also contribute to mitigating negative effects on the economy and to fostering inclusive growth 
(ILO, 2020). There have been repeated calls by international commissions and panels to scale 
up investment in global health security and to strengthen outbreak preparedness and 
responsiveness, subsequent to the SARs (2002-2004) outbreak in Asia and H1N1 swine flu 
(2009) outbreak in the USA and Mexico, and again after the Ebola outbreak (2013-2016) in West 
Africa (2013-2016) and ZIKA outbreak (2015-2016) in the Americas and the Caribbean (IWG and 
Financing Preparedness, 2017; Moon et al., 2015). Nonetheless, countries chronically 
underinvest in preparedness planning, disease and risk monitoring, and primary care (IWG and 
Financing Preparedness, 2017; Moon et al., 2015). This may be due in part to the lack of 
macroeconomic assessments of pandemic risk (Revenga and Galindo, 2020; IWG on Financing 
Preparedness, 2017).  
Global and regional action 
It is generally recommended that international trade should be preserved during epidemics, with 
policies that address short- and long-term trade (Stephens, 2017). During the 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis, trade policy discussion often focused on the issue of protectionism, however most 
governments seemed to conclude that moves to restrict trade are counterproductive (Green, 
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2010). In the current COVID-19 environment, the fragmentation of supply chains and the risk of 
an economic recession have also tempted countries to turn to unilateral and isolationist policies, 
but this may be the opposite of what is needed to boost global output and employment (Revenga 
and Galindo, 2020; Wei, 2020). The pandemic is also threatening global food security, through 
export restrictions (Hendrix, 2020). Support from multilateral organisations, and joint global action 
to keep export markets open, will be crucial for overcoming negative effects of protectionist 
policies and actions (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
It is also essential that efforts be made quickly to mobilise resources and support for lower and 
middle income countries (LMICs) to engage in immediate responses and long-term recovery 
efforts (Patel et al., 2020).  The capacity for economic response is weaker in parts of Asia and 
Latin American middle-income countries (where health capacities are also weaker). Countries 
with considerable poverty, such as in large African economies (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and even 
South Africa) and the whole Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), are likely to 
require even more support (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). While much was done internationally 
to tackle the Ebola outbreak, more could have been done to ensure economic stability, and to 
encourage continued international investment in the region despite the ongoing epidemic at the 
time (Gostin, 2015).  
An effective response to the economic impacts of COVID-19 will require global coordination of 
large-scale funding from international financial institutions and major bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies (Patel et al., 2020). The Asian financial crisis altered the way governments and 
international organisations respond to financial crisis, moving away from structural adjustment 
policies to fiscal stimulus packages (Samphantharak, 2019; Ortiz, 2011) This reversal in thinking 
was demonstrated during the global financial crisis, when governments and international 
organisations instead implemented massive fiscal stimulus packages and near-zero interest rate 
policies (Samphantharak, 2019). Evaluations of interventions during the global financial crisis 
finds that overall, the crisis impact in most countries was not as severe as expected, partly 
because of international efforts (IBRD, 2017). In order to address the economic impacts of 
COVID-19, it is also recommended that governments are prepared to do ‘whatever it takes’ in 
terms of macroeconomic policies (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). 
Monetary policy and support to the financial sector 
During the global financial crisis, central banks throughout the world mitigated the impacts of the 
crisis, including decline in output and trade flows, with expansionary monetary policies (Baldwin 
and di Mauro, 2020; Chauffour and Malouche, 2011). These included actions to cut interest rates 
and maintain the country’s liquidity, and targeted assistance to financial institutions. Countries 
that already had strong regulatory environments, such as Brazil and East Asian countries, 
demonstrated greater resilience to the crisis (Toshniwal, 2012; Green, 2010). 
One of the biggest threats to the economy is that viable businesses become illiquid, resulting in a 
chain-reaction of bankruptcies, job losses and reductions in spending – resulting in a negative 
feedback loop that undermines growth. These kinds of impacts have materialised during prior 
pandemics, transforming temporary disruptions into permanent effects (Baldwin and di Mauro, 
2020; Beck, 2020; Odendahl and Springford, 2020). Central banks can coordinate with financial 
institutions to support viable businesses that would not have otherwise gone under (Baldwin and 
di Mauro, 2020; Odendahl and Springford, 2020). Governments could offer temporary and 
targeted credit guarantees for the near-term liquidity needs of these firms (Gopinath, 2020). 
Once epidemics have come to an end or are under control, longer-term economic recovery can 
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be promoted by helping people to restart activities affected by the epidemic through greater 
access to credit (Guinea, 2014). In China, financial institutions have continued to support firms 
during the post-COVID-19 outbreak period, centred on restarting the economy, with reduced 
interest rates and credit lines for the resumption of work and production (Huang et al., 2020). 
A key lesson learned from prior economic shocks, in particular the East Asian financial crisis 
(1997-1998), is that while it is essential to support businesses and to prevent the failure of 
otherwise viable businesses, propping up non-viable businesses can also hurt longer-term 
recovery (Paci et al., 2010). 
Fiscal policy and social protection 
In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, monetary policy has been less effective, unlike during the 
2008 financial crisis, as the main shock is coming from the real economy, rather than the 
financial sector. Fiscal policy will play a greater role (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Wei, 2020).  
It is important to strengthen resilience to future shocks by creating or preserving fiscal space for 
countercyclical stimulus measures if they are necessary (IBRD, 2017). Studies of Mexico’s peso 
crisis, the East Asian crisis and the global financial crisis find that countries that had the fiscal 
space and flexibility to implement countercyclical expansionary policies experienced smaller 
recessions and lower output volatility, demonstrating greater economic resilience (IBRD, 2010; 
Ortiz et al., 2009). International actors should provide support toward removing the obstacles that 
preclude countries from using countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy, with greater attention to 
expenditure allocations and revenue mobilisation (IBRD, 2017; Ortiz et al., 2009). In order to 
promote longer-term economic recovery once the COVID-19 health crisis is contained and 
business operations begin to normalise, a stimulus package in the form of tax cuts or higher 
public investment to boost aggregate demand is desirable. This would also need to be consistent 
with available fiscal space (Bofinger et al., 2020; Gopinath, 2020).  
An evaluation of the World Bank’s response during the financial crisis finds that insufficient 
attention was given to the available space for fiscal stimulus and to the reversibility of stimulus 
measures (IBRD, 2017). Post-crisis reversibility of short-term programming is also important to 
the successful design of fiscal policy interventions, such that countries do not experience 
deteriorating fiscal deficits in the long-term (IBRD, 2010; Paci et al., 2010).  
Effective and efficient social protection systems are significant sources of resilience, providing 
support to the vulnerable and to a demand-led recovery (ILO, 2020). They are powerful 
economic and social stabilisers of economies and societies, especially if they are already in 
place prior to a crisis (ILO, 2020). Existing social protection schemes have the potential to absorb 
more resources and deliver them to a growing number of targeted households (Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). The Ebola outbreak in West Africa revealed that the lack of social protection 
measures in the context of health epidemics aggravates poverty, unemployment and informality, 
resulting in greater fragility (ILO, 2020). Whereas, in Brazil, the government was able to expand 
its pre-existing large conditional cash transfer programme to address the impacts of the Zika 
epidemic on marginalised populations. Lessons from the global financial crisis also reveals that 
the readiness of countries’ social protection systems was a binding constraint (IEG, 2012). 
Governments must now also provide comprehensive social protection responses to the 
economic impacts of the COVID-19 epidemic (Gerard et al., 2020).  
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Support to SMEs and the self-employed 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the engines of the economy in most lower- and 
middle-income countries (Patel et al., 2020). Key economic lessons from the Ebola crisis include 
the importance of stabilising jobs and livelihoods and support for SME development as a crucial 
pathway to economic recovery (Guinea, 2014). Several countries in Southeast Asia launched 
new programmes during the East Asian crisis aimed at creating jobs through enterprise 
development, but their reach did not extend to the most vulnerable, who did not have assets to 
serve as collateral (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). Recommendations during the current COVID-
19 crisis include strong support for employment to facilitate the recovery process. SMEs and the 
self-employed will be particularly affected by the various disruptions (ILO, 2020). Priorities should 
include supporting firms with financial relief, such as tax relief, subsidies and refinancing, to avoid 
bankruptcy and, in turn, permanent damage to the economy (Blanchard, 2020). Gender 
responsive fiscal policy would allow for identification of SMEs that are owned by women in order 
to ensure that support efforts respond to their specific needs (UNDP, 2020). Support measures 
should also been extended to self-employed workers (Stephens, 2017).   
Support to SMEs that facilitate the maintenance of employment can contribute to longer-term 
economic recovery through lower decline in productivity and in aggregate demand. Firms that are 
able to keep existing employees and not have to hire and train new employees when the 
economy recovers, will be able to recover faster with less turnover costs (Stephens, 2017). 
Losing employees also destroys the specific human capital gains achieved on the job that 
benefits the firm and the worker (Paci et al., 2010).  
Many governments in lower- and middle-income countries have already implemented or are 
considering policy options to support SMEs during the COVID-19 crisis (ILO, 2020; Patel et al., 
2020). Measures to support SMEs in China are considered to be crucial to boosting domestic 
demand, the production networks and the global value chain – thus helping to safeguard the 
stable development of the economy as a whole (Huang et al., 2020). Such measures include 
temporarily deferring and waiving social security contributions and certain taxes, exemptions on 
some rent payments, loan extensions, small-business lending and interest rate reductions and 
subsidy increases (Bouey, 2020; Gopinath, 2020; Huang et al., 2020; ILO, 2020). Despite these 
efforts, SMEs in China still face struggles to meet the COVID-19 prevention requirements of local 
government agencies necessary to reopen (Bouey, 2020). Many small businesses have also 
found that reopening only means they are required to pay rent and salaries without revenue, due 
to continued lower demand (Bouey, 2020). Digital technologies may provide some targeted credit 
support to struggling SMEs. Research has shown that fintech applications (e.g. e-commerce 
finance platforms and supply chain finance platforms) can significantly reduce the operational 
volatility and improve the survival rate of SMEs (see Huang et al., 2020). 
Support to larger companies and job retention 
Similar to the case for SMEs, support to larger companies could include benefits that enable 
them to continue to pay their employees in order to ensure that livelihoods are not lost in the 
short- and long-term, and companies can remain competitive (Stephens, 2017). International 
companies could also be given incentives to maintain their investments. This was not done 
during the Ebola outbreak, and many foreign companies left affected West African countries or 
retracted workers (Stephens, 2017). 
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Governments around the world have adopted new job retention schemes amidst the COVID-19 
epidemic, or expanded existing ones, as in the case of Brazil, (Gerard et al., 2020). The aim of 
such schemes is to avoid the destruction of existing jobs, which should be viable again once the 
public health response is relaxed. Subsidizing these jobs allows firms to continue operations, 
even if at some reduced level, while sparing workers and firms the costs of finding a new job and 
replacing the worker, speeding up the economic recovery (Gerard et al., 2020). In many 
contexts, job retention schemes are also logistically easier than setting up an unemployment 
insurance programme (Gerard et al., 2020). 
Support to specific sectors 
Identifying the particular jobs, sectors or geographic areas through which the economic downturn 
is transmitted is a precondition for effective targeting of policy interventions (Rassy and Smith, 
2013; Paci et al., 2010). Employment interventions to protect the sectors most immediately 
affected and those most vulnerable may yield relatively higher returns (Paci et al., 2010). In 
countries where the tourism sector is important, for example, policies should be designed to 
mitigate the impact on this sector in the event of an epidemic, which would also minimise 
spillover effects to the larger economy (Noy and Shields, 2019). The prior SARS (Severe acute 
respiratory syndrome) epidemic resulted in substantial economic losses in the tourism and 
hospitality sectors in China, but these losses were not necessarily unpreventable. The relative 
speedy recovery after SARS is attributed in part to the existence of crisis management systems 
established by tourism enterprises prior to the onset of SARS (Gu and Wall, 2006). Lessons from 
the H1N1 swine flu outbreak in Mexico also points to the need to engage in targeting and 
preparedness – identifying affected industries that are important to the national and regional 
economy and allocating greater resources to them rather than providing nation-wide subsidies 
(Rassy and Smith, 2013). 
The COVID-19 crisis has resulted in disruptions to production, initially in Asia, then spreading to 
supply chains across the world. Labour-intensive manufacturing industries and service industries 
have been severely affected, with longer-term recovery expected to be tougher in the services 
(Huang et al., 2020; Odendahl and Springford, 2020). Providing support to service sectors will 
also have the effect of targeting support to women, who are often overrepresented in these 
industries, in particular tourism, transport, entertainment, cleaning and remunerated domestic 
services (ILO; 2020; UNDP, 2020). In Latin America, for example, there are nearly twice as many 
businesswomen in tourism than in any other sector (UNDP, 2020). 
Unemployment insurance 
Maintaining livelihoods and labour-related income are essential to protect the ability of workers to 
provide for themselves and their families and to lessen the negative impacts of crises on 
consumer spending and aggregate demand. When the labour market transmission of shocks 
occurs largely through reduction in formal sector employment, the existence of an effective 
unemployment insurance system can serve as an automatic stabiliser, compensating those who 
lose their jobs (Khanna et al., 2010; Paci et al., 2010). Countries that have pre-existing 
‘automatic stabilisers’ have greater options during times of crisis and are better able to support 
workers who are laid off (Gerard et al., 2020; Espino, 2013). The introduction or extension of 
unemployment benefits, the latter of which was achieved in South Korea during the East Asian 
crisis, is a possibility in middle-income countries with good administrative capacity (Paci et al., 
2010).  During the global financial crisis, reduction in earnings in middle-income countries was 
often driven by a reduction in hours worked. In such cases, innovative policies that offered 
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workers access to income maintenance to compensate for temporary reduction in standard 
working hours (e.g. granting partial compensation from the unemployment benefit system on a 
pro-rata basis for the hours lost or providing paid training opportunities) were effective 
interventions (Khanna et al., 2010). The disruptions caused by COVID-19 are expected to result 
in significant job loss (Gerard et al., 2020). Various countries, such as the Philippines, have 
expanded unemployment benefits (ILO, 2020). It may be important also to relax job search 
requirements and extend eligibility rules, such as in Brazil, where workers often have to work for 
at least one year to become eligible for any benefits (Gerard et al., 2020). 
Cash transfers 
In the absence of unemployment insurance systems, labour market contractions during the 
global financial crisis were mitigated in some cases by launching or scaling up temporary labour-
intensive public works or income-support programmes, such as cash transfers (e.g. in El 
Salvador, Mexico, Latvia and Moldova). These measures can also benefit informal workers or 
workers who are subject to wage reductions (IEG, 2012; Paci et al., 2010). In addition, they can 
stimulate the economy through consumer spending and increased aggregate demand (Gerard et 
al., 2020; ILO, 2020; Green, 2010). In countries that already have cash transfer programmes in 
place, expanding benefits and eligibility is essential in mitigating the economic and social impacts 
of COVID-19 (Patel et al., 2020). Many countries, such as Indonesia and Kenya, have 
temporarily topped up the amount received by beneficiaries of social assistance programmes in 
order to enhance income security and boost aggregate demand (Gerard et al., 2020).   
Cash transfers can provide support not only during the earlier phases of outbreak and national 
lockdowns but also during the recovery phase to restart economic activity (Patel et al., 2020). 
Cash transfer programmes in West Africa were instrumental for Ebola survivors, orphans and 
other families of persons who died of Ebola, who received disbursements to restart livelihood 
activities (Guinea, 2014; Patel et al., 2020). During the global financial crisis, cash transfers were 
also given to low-paid poor workers in middle-income countries in order to protect their 
livelihoods from long-term deterioration (Khanna et al., 2010). 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) can serve the dual objective of dampening income shocks and 
promoting investments in human capital, which in turn can improve the longer-term potential of 
the economy (Green, 2010; Paci et al., 2010).  CCTs that require school attendance or the use of 
health facilities can mitigate against declines in human capital stemming from epidemics and 
financial crises, particularly among poorer households that are more likely to withdraw from 
education (Evans and Over, 2020). Due to Brazil’s pre-existing large CCT scheme, Bolsa 
Familia, the country already had in place a financing mechanism to respond to the impacts of the 
Zika epidemic (UNDP, 2017). While CCTs can in principle improve upon the performance of 
unconditional cash transfers and contribute to longer-term recovery, successful implementation 
of such schemes requires substantial administrative capacity (Paci et al., 2010). In the current 
COVID-19 crisis, it is recommended that CCT and public works programmes are temporarily 
made unconditional, as the conditions may undermine social distancing (Gerard et al., 2020). 
While permanent CCT programmes, such as those in Latin America, are well suited to 
addressing chronic poverty, there are concerns that they may lack the flexibility to protect the 
near poor and/or transitory poor, who also need to be targeted during crises (IEG, 2012). 
Experience from previous crises in developing countries suggest that measuring impacts of 
crises should be a priority in order to identify populations, households and enterprises most in 
need to target for support (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). During the Ebola epidemic, this was 
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done effectively through low-cost phone surveys in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). Some developing countries, such as Colombia and Peru, have already been 
taking innovative steps toward preparedness and response to the COVID-19 crisis, identifying 
those most affected through street and phone polling (Revenga and Galindo, 2020).  
Using existing programmes to extend assistance to new beneficiaries requires not only 
information on potential beneficiaries, but also payment infrastructure to reach them (Gerard et 
al., 2020). Some governments, as in Chile and India, have leveraged identity-linked bank 
accounts, established for financial inclusion purposes to provide direct support to the poor 
(Gerard et al., 2020). In Brazil, the government has also created a new website to extend 
coverage to informal workers at large (Gerard et al., 2020). Relying on digital payment 
infrastructures is quick and safer in an epidemic, but it may exclude vulnerable households, who 
do not have access to a computer or smartphone. Delivery to recipients could be facilitated 
instead by involving local governments or non-state actors (Gerard et al., 2020). 
In-kind transfers 
Policies and programmes designed to assist in the short-term must aim to ensure that basic 
essentials are available (Stephens, 2017). Programmes may provide cash, in-kind assistance 
(e.g. food, fuel) or subsidised access to essential goods and services (e.g. health services, 
housing). Where supply chains are impacted or prices rise, in-kind provision will be most 
powerful, and public procurement will support producers as well (Gerard et al., 2020). Food 
security and maintaining livelihoods were key priority areas during the Ebola outbreak (Stephens, 
2017; Guinea, 2014). Similarly, during the COVID-19 crisis, governments in many middle-income 
countries are developing short-term support measures to help vulnerable populations meet basic 
needs. India, for example, announced a $23 billion aid package, aimed at feeding 800 million of 
its poorest citizens through distribution of wheat, rice, and pulses (Patel et al., 2020). 
Public works programmes 
During the East Asian crisis, public works programmes provided unemployed workers with much-
needed income, particularly in the absence of unemployment insurance schemes (Betcherman 
and Islam, 2001). While such programmes can be vital for long-term potential growth, they often 
fail to provide effective support to economic activity in the short term due to frequent delays 
(Green, 2010). Some large infrastructure projects were also considered wasteful 
(Samphantharak, 2019). In addition, as observed in Central America during the global financial 
crisis, women risk being underrepresented as beneficiaries of public works programmes as 
construction is traditionally considered a ‘male’ sector (Espino, 2013). During the current COVID-
19 crisis, the conditions of public works programmes cannot be fulfilled during lockdown, but 
could be a source of recovery in the post-outbreak phase (Gerard et al., 2020). In China, a 
number of key projects related to energy, transportation and information technology industries 
have been launched and financed by special local government bonds (Huang et al., 2020). 
2. Health and economics 
Investing in health capacity and pandemic preparedness is one of the most productive 
investments for health and for inclusive economic growth (WHO, 2016; Brahmbhatt and 
Jonas, 2015). It can not only mitigate the disastrous health impacts of epidemics and pandemics 
but also contribute to mitigating negative effects on the economy and to inclusive growth (ILO, 
2020).  
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The health sector, however, is traditionally viewed as a cost to the economy – an expense 
to be carefully controlled to protect opportunities for inclusive growth (WHO, 2016). Recent 
studies have found instead that the health sector’s annual growth rate exceeds that of the 
manufacturing and service sectors (see WHO, 2016). Driven by research and technology, the 
health sector is well positioned to be have a large employment effect in the wider economy, 
expanding the number of decent jobs and building skills through education and training. It is able 
to redeploy workers from manufacturing and other service sectors, making it an important 
stabilising factor during economic slowdowns (WHO, 2016). In the current context, targeted 
investment in health systems is essential in building resilience against COVID-19, while also 
providing an opportunity to create decent jobs (ILO, 2020). 
Pandemic preparedness 
There have been repeated calls by international commissions and panels to scale up 
investment in global health security and to strengthen outbreak preparedness and 
responsiveness, subsequent to the SARs and H1N1 swine flu outbreaks, and again after the 
Ebola and Zika outbreaks (IWG and Financing Preparedness, 2017; Moon et al., 2015). The 
Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola finds that the shortage of 
capacities in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone to detect, report and respond rapidly to outbreaks 
enabled Ebola to develop into a national, and worldwide, crisis (Moon et al., 2015). Nonetheless, 
countries chronically underinvest in preparedness planning, disease and risk monitoring, and 
primary care (IWG and Financing Preparedness, 2017; Moon et al., 2015).  
There have been some regional efforts to improve preparedness that can serve as 
important models, in particular lessons from SARs. East Asian countries that appear to have 
responded most effectively to COVID-19 – Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and to some 
extent, China, are also those that suffered most from the prior SARS epidemic. They learnt and 
implemented lessons in response (Revenga and Galindo, 2020).  The SARS epidemic left the 
world four clear lessons for improved healthcare and capacity to address epidemics:  
1. Invest in preparedness systems, such as ‘wide net’ surveillance systems, isolation and 
quarantine policies and effective contact-tracing systems. East Asian countries gained 
important clinical insights into the coronavirus from their SARS experience, and 
implemented infrastructure adjustments in hospitals (including building outside waiting 
rooms to avoid crowding potentially infectious patients in air-conditioned emergency 
rooms). In the case of Singapore, for example, the institutional structures and the health 
control, tracing and surveillance systems put in place during SARs were quickly refined 
and applied during the H1N1 pandemic and currently in the case of COVID-19. The 
contact-tracing system it developed helped cut the time to trace an infected person down 
to a few hours (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
2. Centralise decision making in authorised and adequately resourced institutions (such 
as Taiwan’s Central Epidemic Command Centre) and/or strengthen command, control 
and coordination systems between government agencies (as Singapore did). 
Understanding the significance of the state’s role in crisis management and the 
importance of building the state’s capacity to act, decide and manage a dangerous 
outbreak was one of the most important lessons to emerge from SARS (Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). 
3. Strengthen investment in public health and research, such as by creating new 
infectious diseases programmes in major universities; strengthening relationships 
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between public health officials and the research community; funding clinical research and 
building a world-class research capacity (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
4. Be transparent and timely in public communications (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). It 
is essential to prioritise the active and transparent reporting of timely and accurate data 
and to prevent the spread of inaccurate or biased information (Noy and Shields, 2019).  
Available clear and visible information can guide individual responses in a way that 
minimises transmission pathways. It can also contribute to economic resilience by 
curtailing misinformation, reducing uncertainty and boosting confidence at all levels of the 
economy (ILO, 2020; Noy and Shields, 2019; Noy et al., 2019).  
The general failure to effectively adopt these lessons elsewhere, leaving many countries 
unprepared to face a double health-economic shock, may be due in part to the lack of 
macroeconomic assessments of pandemic risk (Revenga and Galindo, 2020; IWG on 
Financing Preparedness, 2017). This is despite such assessments frequently recognising, in the 
after-math, the tremendous economic costs of such events. Further, the few macroeconomic 
assessments that are done are not systemically linked to country policy and budgeting 
processes. These shortfalls have the effect of depriving preparedness of the fiscal and policy 
attention that it warrants (IWG on Financing Preparedness, 2017). It is essential that the scale of 
risk associated with infectious disease crises is made visible and salient to governments, 
particularly ministries of finance (IWG on Financing Preparedness, 2017).  Governments need in 
turn to invest domestically in building core public health and system capacities and to mobilize 
adequate external support to supplement efforts in poorer countries (Moon et al., 2015). 
Engaging the private sector 
Engagement of the private sector and public institutions beyond the health sector 
remains limited in overall epidemic and pandemic preparedness, planning and 
intervention (Smith et al., 2019; IWG on Financing Preparedness, 2017). Given that private-
sector companies have much to lose from disease outbreaks, the systematic lack of engagement 
of private sector actors in aspects of the response is a notable gap (UNDP, 2017).  Research on 
Ebola and Zika, for example, emphasise the need for collaboration with the local private sector 
(Tambo et al., 2017; UNDP, 2017).   
Possible ways to engage the private sector more effectively include: 
1. Building greater awareness of the risks of infectious disease outbreaks amongst 
private sector leaders. The aim is to improve their own internal preparedness; reduce 
resistance to taxes or regulations related to reinforcing pandemic prevention and 
response; and increase inclination to work with governments to mitigate the risks (IWG 
on Financing Preparedness, 2017). Drawing on previous epidemics, business continuity 
planning has proved to promote business sustainability by identifying and managing 
risks; establishing response plans; and taking action to minimize disruption and ensure 
that the workplace and workers are protected and prepared (ILO, 2020). 
2. Involving the private sector in government plans to reinforce preparedness and 
response, and leveraging relevant private sector assets and capabilities (IWG on 
Financing Preparedness, 2017). Constructive and persistent channels of communication 
between governments and social partners is important in developing effective responses 
at the enterprise, sectoral and macroeconomic level, as demonstrated by historic 
economic crises (ILO, 2020). 
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3. Introducing regulations to enforce appropriate investment by particular private 
sector companies in risk mitigation and preparedness. Companies to target include 
those involved in livestock production, where there is a notable risk of infectious diseases 
(IWG on Financing Preparedness, 2017). 
3. Global and regional action 
While the COVID-19 crisis has hit higher income countries first, both in its health and 
economic aspects, the effects have quickly been spreading to middle-income and low-
income countries that have less capacity to respond (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). Many 
low-income and some middle-income countries will need global support to mobilise the resources 
needed to tackle the health crisis and its economic impacts (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
Trade and investment 
It is generally recommended that international trade between epidemic countries should 
be preserved (Stephens, 2017). While the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global 
Response to Ebola recommends that trade and logistics operators are preserved in order to 
maintain ordinary economic operations (Moon et al., 2015), it does not give any specific advice 
on how this is to be accomplished (Stephens, 2017).   
Lessons from SARS include the need for a short- and long-term trade policy to ensure 
that both short- and long-term economic effects of epidemics are mitigated (Stephens, 
2017). The emphasis on a long-term policy is based on findings that the economic impacts of 
epidemics are frequently felt long after the pathogen is contained, up to five years later (see Lee 
2013; cited in Stephens, 2017).  As such, short-term trade barrier reprieves and temporary 
beneficial trade conditions of only a few months are unlikely to be beneficial for the longer-term 
(Stephens, 2017).  
During the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, trade policy discussion often focused on the 
issue of protectionism, however most governments seemed to conclude that moves to 
restrict trade are counterproductive (Green, 2010). Protectionist actions, such as the 
introduction of domestic subsidies to support domestic producers across the globe, were 
minimally followed or quickly terminated. As such, on balance, while trade was still affected by 
declines in consumer spending and aggregate output demand, protectionist impacts on 
international trade was limited (Green, 2010).  
In the current COVID-19 environment, protectionist trade policies may also be more 
counterproductive than helpful (Revenga and Galindo, 2020; Wei, 2020). The economic 
impact of COVID-19 disruptions requires evaluation through multiple lenses, including 
manufacturing supply chains; tourism, transportation and service relationships; and energy and 
commodity demand and prices (Mann et al., 2020). These linkages and factors will have different 
weights for different countries (Mann et al., 2020). Given these global interconnections, it is 
essential to look beyond national responses and assess which global coordinated actions can 
make a difference. At a time when borders are closing, supply chains are fragmenting, and 
transport, trade and logistics networks are under stress, there may be a temptation to turn 
towards unilateral and isolationist policies (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). The risk of an economic 
recession also often tempts countries to raise trade barriers (Wei, 2020). These actions, 
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however, may be the opposite of what is needed to boost global output and employment 
(Revenga and Galindo, 2020; Wei, 2020). 
The COVID-19 pandemic is threatening global food security, through export restrictions 
(Hendrix, 2020). While larger economies lose efficiency and purchasing power over time when 
turning inward, they can withstand the costs for a longer period of time. In contrast, for many 
developing countries, being cut off from hard-currency income in the form of lost exports can 
threaten lives (Obstfeld and Posen, 2020). Over the longer term, escalating deglobalisation could 
result in cutting the global South from access to global opportunities, inputs and technology 
which could impede their recovery from any crisis significantly (Obstfeld and Posen, 2020). 
Support from multilateral organisations, and joint global action to keep export markets 
open, will be crucial for overcoming negative effects of protectionist policies and actions 
(Revenga and Galindo, 2020).  The G20 needs to take aggressive steps to safeguard global food 
security, in particular (Hendrix, 2020). It is recommended that the G20 disavow export 
restrictions, with the possible exception of India, the only G20-member major exporter with a 
large undernourished population (Hendrix, 2020). The G20 should also commit publicly to 
intervene should prices in global markets begin rising rapidly, through the actual release of 
physical stocks and in some cases, merely the announcement of the intention to release. During 
the global financial crisis in 2008, the announcement alone by Japan that it might release 
stockpiled purchases of US-exported rice was sufficient to bring down prices (Hendrix, 2020). 
Policies should also be in place to mitigate disruptions to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
during epidemics (Stephens, 2017). FDI is essential to economic growth and recovery in 
developing countries. During the Ebola outbreak, FDI in West Africa was put on hold from many 
sources. This likely slowed economic recovery even after Ebola was stopped. Plans to maintain 
and encourage FDI during and after epidemics will improve economic recovery (Stephens, 
2017). Where possible and beneficial, the affected country could offer incentives to companies 
that continue investment during a specific period of time.  Incentives could include tax breaks by 
the home country, special insurance from losses incurred because of the epidemic, or even a 
scheme of government matching capital investments within the area (Stephens, 2017).  
China, during the post-outbreak period of COVID-19, has focused on restarting the 
economy with a package of policies to stabilise international trade and foreign investment 
and to further open the market. These include export tax rebates and an increase in foreign 
trade credits and extension of debt rollovers for small trading firms severely affected by the 
epidemic (Huang et al., 2020). Commercial insurance companies have also been encouraged to 
offer short-term trade credit insurance and lower fees for trading firms (Huang et al., 2020). 
Diversification 
Lessons from prior financial crises and their impacts in Southeast Asia demonstrate that 
diversification in exports can mitigate the economic impacts of financial crises 
(Samphantharak, 2019). Due to their outward-oriented development strategy, the countries in the 
region have been particularly vulnerable to global fluctuations on their exports.  The global 
financial crisis, for example, led to drop in exports from the region, resulting in an economic 
slowdown in many countries in Southeast Asia (Samphantharak, 2019). A comparative study of 
middle-income countries in Latin America and East Asia finds that GDP in countries in the latter 
region fell to a higher extent than Latin American nations due to greater reliance on export-led 
growth in East Asia (Foxley, 2009). 
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While Southeast Asia remains dependent on exports, the region has diversified away from 
primary products into manufacturing since the mid-1980s debt crisis, lessening the 
negative economic impact of the global financial crisis (Samphantharak, 2019). The severity 
of crises thus depends on how domestic governments responded to prior external shocks 
(Samphantharak, 2019). Many learned from the debt crisis in the 1980s and the East Asian 
financial crisis and implemented policy reforms that helped to mitigate the economic impacts of 
the global financial crisis (Samphantharak, 2019). 
Attention to regional trade networks may also contribute to mitigating the effects of a 
decline in global trade. The rise in intra-regional trade in Asia, prior to the global financial crisis, 
helped to mitigate some of the decline in demand from OECD countries (Green, 2010). Similarly, 
in Africa, intra-African trade has been resilient and rising rapidly since the global financial crisis 
(Mold and Mveyange, 2020). With imports to East Africa from China disrupted due to COVID-19, 
governments and industries in the region could benefit from greater attention to regional value 
chains (Mold and Mvenyange, 2020). 
Coordination and support for developing countries 
The fact that the COVID-19 crisis is impacting almost all countries at much the same time, 
in terms of health and economic effects, makes it particularly challenging to organise a 
coordinated global response that can mitigate impacts (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
Governments in many high-income countries are overwhelmed managing their own domestic 
COVID-19 crises and multilateral agencies are facing unprecedented demands for support (Patel 
et al., 2020).  
Despite these constraints and challenges, it is essential that efforts be made quickly to 
mobilise resources and support for LMICs to address immediate response and long-term 
recovery efforts (Patel et al., 2020).  As seen from the global financial crisis and from the H1N1 
swine flu pandemic in the USA and Mexico, economic and health impacts will spread quickly to 
lower- and middle-income economics, where under-resourced systems and institutions are much 
less prepared to roll out an adequate response (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). The capacity for 
economic response is weaker in parts of Asia and Latin American middle-income 
countries (where health capacities are also weaker). In countries with considerable poverty, such 
as in large African economies (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and even South Africa) and the whole 
Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), thin investment capacities and 
unprepared healthcare systems are of particular concern and likely to require special support 
(Revenga and Galindo, 2020). Comparing the outbreak of Ebola in the Western African countries 
of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2013-2016 and the outbreak of the Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in South Korea in 2015, the countries in Africa lacked 
significantly the preparedness and resources to address the epidemic. In contrast, Korea had the 
resources and capacity to effectively deal with the health and economic impacts (Gostin, 2015).  
While much was done internationally to tackle the Ebola outbreak, more could have been 
done to ensure economic stability, and to encourage continued international investment in the 
region despite the ongoing epidemic at the time (Gostin, 2015). The health and economic 
impacts of Ebola (including border closing and trade restrictions) produced significantly more 
hardships (Stephens, 2017).  
The G20 which came into being in response to the global financial crisis must act even 
more forcefully during this current pandemic crisis, with more lasting commitment (Obstfeld 
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and Posen, 2020). Without international support, the COVID-19 pandemic will leave deep scars 
in the developing world, adding to their debt burdens and causing a massive reversal of 
development gains (Gelpern et al., 2020; Patel et al., 2020). While not every economy is 
suffering in the same way and amount, all economies need to move in the same direction, as 
each country’s health and economic performance largely depends on the rest of the world 
(Obstfeld and Posen, 2020; Revenga and Galindo, 2020).  
An effective response will also require global coordination of large-scale funding from 
international financial institutions and major bilateral and multilateral donor agencies 
(Patel et al., 2020). To help manage debt distress for the countries most exposed, the G20 
should call for a temporary pause on sovereign debt payments to official and private creditors 
(Gelpern et al., 2020). 
The Asian financial crisis altered the way governments and international organisations 
respond to financial crisis, moving away from orthodox policies to fiscal stimulus 
packages. Subsequent to Mexico’s peso crisis in 1994, Mexican authorities implemented a 
harsh austerity program that included higher taxes, increases in energy prices, and expenditure 
cuts. While this contributed to an improvement in investor confidence and a more stable 
economy in the longer-term, the country experienced significant hardship in the interim (Ortiz, 
2011). Companies suffered from drastic declines in consumer demand. The orthodox policies 
imposed on Thailand and Indonesia by the IMF at the beginning phase of the Asian financial 
crisis – including high interest rates and austere fiscal policy – have received criticism for having 
exacerbated the severity of the crisis. It resulted in more bankruptcies of firms and financial 
institutions and reduced aggregate demand, which pushed the economy into further recession 
(Samphantharak, 2019). A comparative study of countries that were affected by Mexico’s peso 
crisis, the East Asian crisis and Russian crisis finds that countries that tightened monetary and 
fiscal policy during these crises experienced larger output contractions and more severe 
recessions than the countries that followed a looser policy stance. The study cautions, however, 
that these outcomes may not necessarily be due to the different policy responses, but to the pre-
existing conditions of the country at the start of the crisis (Ortiz et al., 2009). International actors 
should thus seek to support the removal obstacles that preclude countries from using 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy in times of external financial crisis, as this flexibility can 
result in smaller recessions and lower volatility of output (Ortiz et al., 2009). For further 
discussion, see discussion on ‘fiscal space’ under the fiscal policy section. 
A reversal in thinking toward more expansionary policies was demonstrated during the 
global financial crisis, when governments and international organisations instead implemented 
massive fiscal stimulus packages and near-zero interest rate policies (Samphantharak, 2019).  
The World Bank Group provided, for example, fiscal, financial sector and social safety net 
support, which helped to improve country resilience to global financial crisis (IBRD, 2017). 
Evaluations of interventions during the global financial crisis finds that overall, the crisis 
impact in most countries was not as severe as expected, partly because of international 
efforts (IBRD, 2017). In some cases, notably in Indonesia, precautionary World Bank funding 
helped countries meet their continued financing needs at reasonable cost (IBRD, 2017). Lending 
was increased to fill financing gaps, particularly to middle income borrowers. The Bank also 
sought to facilitate countercyclical fiscal spending and to protect public expenditure in key social 
sectors to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable (IBRD, 2017). Disbursements 
helped countries maintain social programmes and microfinance. In Mexico, for example, support 
was given to Oportunidades (the national CCT programme that helps the most vulnerable 
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families to cope with poverty) and in Bangladesh, an International Development Assistance loan 
helped to mitigate the impact of high food prices on the poor through an expansion of social 
safety net programmes, including public works (IBRD, 2010). 
In order to address the economic impacts of COVID-19, it is also recommended that 
governments should be prepared to do ‘whatever it takes’ in terms of macroeconomic 
policies (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). Some view the prospects for economic recovery as 
better than in the global financial crisis to the extent that there is a clear path of recovery and 
rebound after the end of the epidemic (Bofinger et al., 2020; Odendahl and Springford, 2020). 
This presupposes however that governments enact early and aggressive economic policies to 
(see Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Blanchard, 2020; Bofinger et al., 2020; ILO, 2020; Odendahl 
and Springford, 2020; Revenga and Galindo, 2020):  
 Support the liquidity of households and firms and minimise unnecessary bankruptcies 
that could cause permanent damage to the economy;  
 Protect the financial system;  
 Offset lost wages for workers and ensure people have money to keep spending; 
 Protect the most vulnerable through social protection measures, including targeted 
transfers;   
 Stimulate the economy more broadly, such as through public investment and tax relief 
and subsidies to support business continuity, particularly SMEs and the self-employed; 
4. Monetary policy and support to the financial sector 
During the global financial crisis, central banks throughout the world came to the rescue 
to mitigate the impacts of the crisis, implementing expansionary monetary policies 
(alongside expansionary fiscal policies) (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). The clear character of the 
crisis as stemming from problems in financial markets was a cue to central banks everywhere to 
move quickly to easing credit conditions (Green, 2010). Following coordinated action by OECD 
monetary authorities, the central banks of Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines) also reacted in a coordinated manner to aggressively reduce key policy interest rates 
and make credit more generally available (Samphantharak, 2019; Green, 2010).  
The central banks of many middle income countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa, also provided significant support to their local banks. These 
measures helped to mitigate the global decline in output and trade flows and stimulated more 
confidence in the outlook of individual countries (Chauffour and Malouche, 2011). The 
government in Brazil, similar to other emerging market economies, used state financial 
institutions to kick-start lending and to provide liquidity to asset markets (Toshniwal, 2012). 
Interventions in Mexico, which was greatly affected by the crisis due to its close economic 
relations with the U.S., also helped the country to mitigate impacts. The government used a 
variety of tools, including interventions by the central bank to cut interest rates and maintain the 
country’s liquidity, targeted assistance to financial institutions, and actions to increase confidence 
by securing lines of credit (Villarreal, 2010). While Mexico did not use the credit lines, their 
existence were enough to improve confidence in the economy (Villarreal, 2010). 
Countries that already had strong regulatory environments demonstrated greater 
resilience to the crisis. Brazil’s strict regulatory environment, for example, resulted in greater 
resilience and helped Brazil to avoid some of the problems seen elsewhere (Toshniwal, 2012). 
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Similarly, the stronger regulatory systems and internal systems implemented in Southeast Asia 
after the East Asian crisis helped it to weather the crisis better (Green, 2010).   
In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, monetary policy has not been particularly effective, 
unlike during the 2008 financial crisis, as the main shock is coming from the real 
economy, rather than the financial sector (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Wei, 2020). Despite 
major cuts in interest rates by central banks, including the European Central Bank, expectations 
of the depth and duration of the crisis seemed rather unaffected (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; 
Wei, 2020).  In such circumstances, there is a limit to how much more central banks can do to 
stimulate the economy (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Wei, 2020).  While governments should be 
prepared to use monetary policy as a tool, as in the global financial crisis, fiscal policy will play a 
greater role during the COVID-19 crisis (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). 
It is essential that efforts are made to ensure that the economic crisis produced by 
COVID-19 and related disruptions does not develop into a financial crisis (Beck, 2020; 
Wyplos, 2020). The economic disruption has resulted in shocks to the financial sector, reflected 
in financial market distortions and funding concerns for many market participants, including 
banks. Households that are not earning money, for example, might not be able to repay 
mortgages and consumer credits (Beck, 2020).  
One of the biggest threats to the economy is that viable businesses become illiquid, 
resulting in bankruptcies and job losses (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Beck, 2020; Odendahl 
and Springford, 2020). Businesses that took on significant levels of debt in recent years are 
particularly vulnerable to reductions in the cashflow (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). Businesses 
that no longer have clients, due to current disruptions, may be unable to repay loans and may 
draw down credit lines (Beck, 2020). The bankruptcy of one firm can put other firms in danger, 
resulting in a chain-reaction of bankruptcies, along with ensuing labour layoffs. In turn, workers 
who lose their jobs spend less. These kinds of impacts have materialised during prior pandemics, 
transforming temporary disruptions into permanent effects (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Beck, 
2020; Odendahl and Springford, 2020).  
Central banks can provide emergency liquidity to the financial sector and coordinate with 
financial institutions to support viable businesses that would not have otherwise gone 
under (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Gourinchas, 2020; Odendahl and Springford, 2020). They 
will need to step in as a lender of last resort to their governments, to banks and other financial 
institutions, which in turn could help to stabilise the markets (Wyplos, 2020). Coordination among 
central banks, finance ministers, bank regulators and public investment banks is required 
(Odendahl and Springford, 2020). 
Small and medium enterprises, which may be less prepared to withstand sharp 
disruption, are more likely to require support. Governments could offer temporary and 
targeted credit guarantees for the near-term liquidity needs of these firms (Gopinath, 2020). 
South Korea, for example, has expanded lending for business operations and loan guarantees 
for affected SMEs. Financial market regulators and supervisors could also encourage, on a 
temporary and time-bound basis, extensions of loan maturities (Gopinath, 2020). During the 
outbreak period in China, the central bank eased market credit through conventional policy 
instruments (Huang et al., 2020). Financial institutions cut the loan rate and provided additional 
credit to virus-related manufacturers, daily necessity retail and delivery sectors, and producers of 
critical medical products (Huang et al., 2020). In order to support small and medium enterprises, 
commercial banks were required to roll over debt contingencies (Huang et al., 2020).  
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A key lesson learned from prior economic shocks is that while it is essential to support 
businesses and to prevent the failure of otherwise viable businesses, propping up non-
viable businesses could hurt longer-term recovery. During the East Asian crisis, for example, 
Korean credit guarantee policies towards SMEs were often provided to relatively unproductive 
SMEs, which undermined the effectiveness of mitigating interventions. In contrast, in the case of 
larger firms, banks reallocated credit away from less efficient firms to more efficient firms, which 
paved the way for longer-term recovery (Paci et al., 2010). Similarly, during the 1980s debt crisis, 
a comparative look at the credit market policies of Mexico and Chile finds that while both 
countries suffered severe economic shocks, Chile recovered much faster than Mexico. This is 
attributed in large part to the willingness of Chile to let inefficient firms go bankrupt, whereas 
Mexico was not (Paci et al., 2010). 
Once epidemics have come to an end or are under control, longer-term economic 
recovery can be promoted by helping people to restart activities affected by the epidemic 
through greater access to credit (Guinea, 2014). This can be through the provision of long-
term credit facilities (operating through commercial banks) to increase access to credit by firms 
that reduced operations (Guinea, 2014). In China, during the post-COVID-19 outbreak period, 
the government focused on restarting the economy, with financial institutions continuing to 
support SMEs with reduced interest rates and credit lines for the resumption of work and 
production (Huang et al., 2020). For further discussion on support for restarting livelihood and 
business activities, see the cash transfers section. 
5. Fiscal policy and social protection 
Mitigating the negative impacts from the disruptions caused by COVID-19 requires 
extensive fiscal stimulus as the main shock is coming from the real economy (Baldwin and 
di Mauro, 2020). As noted previously, while monetary policy was of greater importance during the 
global financial crisis, there was a global consensus on the additional need for fiscal stimulus 
(IBRD, 2010). Similar to flattening the epidemic curve, it is important to flatten the “recession 
curve” through macroeconomic interventions that can mitigate the negative economic impacts 
and counter a deep and prolonged recession. 
See: Figure 1. Flattening the recession curve, Source: Gourinchas, 2020, p.35, 
https://voxeu.org/content/mitigating-covid-economic-crisis-act-fast-and-do-whatever-it-takes 
 
It is important to strengthen resilience to future shocks by creating or preserving future 
fiscal space for countercyclical stimulus measures, if they are necessary (IBRD, 2017). A 
study involving countries affected by Mexico’s peso crisis and East Asian Crisis finds that 
countries which had the flexibility to implement expansionary policies experienced smaller 
recessions and lower output volatility (Ortiz et al., 2009). This was also a key lesson drawn from 
the 2008 financial crisis. Countries with limited fiscal space had less room to respond and 
suffered more severe impacts; whereas those with more fiscal space demonstrated greater 
economic resilience (IBRD, 2010).  Countries with higher levels of GDP per capita, lower levels 
of debt, lower inflation, larger foreign exchange reserves and positive or only moderately 
negative fiscal and current account balances are considered to have more fiscal space. They are 
also more likely to have positive macroeconomic benefits from a fiscal stimulus package (van 
Doorn et al., 2010).  Pre-existing conditions in each country can greatly affect the types of 
responses possible, constraints, and outcomes in the short- and longer-term (Ortiz et al., 2009). 
A country without these pre-existing conditions might still be able to run a fiscal expansion, 
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without destabilising the economy, if markets are confident that the level of debt is sustainable 
and of the prospect of macroeconomic stability (van Doorn et al., 2010). For further discussion, 
see the section on coordination and support for developing countries.   
For a detailed discussion on lessons learned from public finance management reforms 
introduced in developing countries after a financial crisis, that contribute to the creation of fiscal 
space,  see K4D report 810 (Quak, 2020). 
As a group, developing countries had grown more rapidly than developed countries, prior 
to the financial crisis, which allowed them to lead the global recovery (IBRD, 2010). Among 
middle-income countries, China, Nigeria, Chile, Malaysia and Thailand had higher levels of fiscal 
space, with Egypt, Argentina, Turkey, the Ukraine and Hungary at the lower ends (van Doorn et 
al., 2010). After a series of countercyclical fiscal policy measures, most countries ended up with 
less macroeconomic space by the end of 2009 than at the start of the crisis. Countries with 
greater fiscal space were more able to ramp up their fiscal spending and had the largest room to 
respond to the prolonged crisis (van Doorn et al., 2010). An evaluation of the World Bank’s 
response during the crisis finds that while its attention to reforms in public financial management 
can be expected strengthen fiscal sustainability over the long-term, more attention needs to be 
given to concrete measures to strengthen medium-term fiscal sustainability (IBRD, 2017).  
Greater attention to expenditure allocations and revenue mobilisation could help to create or 
preserve the space for fiscal countercyclical stimulus measures (IBRD, 2017). For further 
discussion on pre-existing conditions and fiscal space, see the section on coordination and 
support for developing countries. 
In the case of COVID-19, a stimulus package in the form of tax cuts or higher public 
investment to boost aggregate demand is desirable in order to promote longer-term 
economic recovery once the health crisis is contained and business operations begin to 
normalise. It would, however, have to be consistent with available fiscal space (Bofinger et al., 
2020; Gopinath, 2020).  
Post-crisis reversibility of short-term programming is also important to the successful 
design of fiscal policy interventions, such that countries do not experience deteriorating 
fiscal deficits in the long-term (IBRD, 2010; Paci et al., 2010). Policies designed to mitigate the 
short-term impact of crises, such as countercyclical spending programmes are typically 
temporary in nature. Such programmes, while having helped to mitigate the impacts of the global 
financial crisis, have also contributed to deteriorating fiscal deficits in both developed and 
developing countries. They needed to be rolled back as recovery took hold (IBRD, 2010). An 
evaluation of the World Bank’s response during the financial crisis finds that insufficient attention 
was given not only to the available space for fiscal stimulus, but also to the reversibility of 
stimulus measures (IBRD, 2017). Fiscal policy interventions should be able to be scaled up 
quickly and effectively as crises evolve, and scaled down as recovery begins – similar to 
automatic stabilisers, such as unemployment benefits or cash transfers systems that allow for the 
number of beneficiaries to change in response to need (Paci et al., 2010).   
Effective and efficient social protection systems are significant sources of resilience, 
allowing societies to cope with emergencies and to mitigate the impact of potential crises 
– providing support to the vulnerable and to a demand-led recovery (ILO, 2020). They are 
powerful economic and social stabilisers of economies and societies, especially if they are 
already in place prior to a crisis (ILO, 2020). Existing social protection schemes have the 
potential to absorb more resources and deliver them to a growing number of targeted households 
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(Revenga and Galindo, 2020). Unemployment and social assistance schemes, and other safety 
nets of last resort, for example, can be quickly expanded to cover the most vulnerable 
households that lack savings and assets to draw on during an extended crisis (Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). It is also well recognised that social protection pays an important role in 
supporting aggregate demand, and supporting a demand-led recovery, during crises (ILO, 2020).   
Experience from prior epidemic crises in developing countries demonstrates that 
expenditures must prioritise strengthening the social safety net (Revenga and Galindo, 
2020). Support programmes for the poor and marginalised, that operate countercyclically, can 
mitigate negative impacts on growth. The programmes expand when growth weakens, shrinking 
when more opportunity for employment emerges (Green, 2010). The Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa revealed that the lack of social protection measures in the context of health epidemics 
aggravates poverty, unemployment and informality, resulting in greater fragility (ILO, 2020). In 
contrast, many governments in Latin America and the Caribbean have since the 1990s 
established targeted social safety nets to alleviate poverty and inequality. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, 
for example, one of the largest conditional cash transfer schemes in the world, was relied upon in 
the government’s response to Zika and demonstrated a unique ability to adapt to the situation 
(UNDP, 2017). For further discussion, see the cash transfers section.  
Lessons from the global financial crisis also reveals that the readiness of countries’ 
social protection systems was a binding constraint (IEG, 2012). The immediate severity of 
the financial crisis did not allow for the development of new and more efficient programmes (IEG, 
2012). Even middle-income countries with established social protection systems found it 
challenging to adapt their programmes to identify which groups were most affected and to target 
them (IEG, 2012).  In Europe and Central Asia, for example, the social protection programmes 
that could be used to mitigate crisis impacts were typically small, fragmented and poorly 
coordinated, targeting narrow groups. It was not possible to repurpose them to address 
temporary shocks, resulting in limited impact (IEG, 2012). Better-prepared countries typically had 
broader social protection systems whose different programs complemented one another, 
allowing for flexible scale up and reach of crisis-affected and poor and vulnerable people (IEG, 
2012). In response to the global financial crisis, the number of developing countries with some 
form of social safety net has doubled, from 72 in 2000 to over 150 in 2018. This will help greatly 
in the current COVID-19 crisis (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
Governments in developing countries will have to provide comprehensive social 
protection responses to the economic impacts of the COVID-19 epidemic (Gerard et al., 
2020). These measures include those aimed at extending existing social protection policies to 
vulnerable populations (UNDP, 2020). The most vulnerable groups and households during the 
COVID-19 crisis are most likely to be the elderly, youth, women, informal workers, and low-wage 
workers. Such workers are least likely to be able to work remotely, most likely to lose their jobs 
due to extended illness, and less likely to have savings to serve as a buffer during an economic 
downturn (Revenga and Galindo, 2020; UNDP, 2020).  An economic safety net, comprising of 
cash transfers, sick leave, and subsidized health coverage, is necessary to help the most 
vulnerable and to support enterprises that serve them (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). Wage 
subsidies and tax relief could further help businesses hit by supply disruptions and a drop in 
demand to stay afloat (Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020; Gaspar and Mauro, 2020). 
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Support to SMEs and the self-employed 
Small and medium enterprises are the engines of the economy in most lower- and middle-
income countries (Patel et al., 2020). In China, for example, they comprise 99.6 percent of the 
country’s companies and 80 percent of national employment (Bouey, 2020). They account for 
more than 60 percent of China’s GDP, contribute more than 50 percent of tax collections and 
hold more than 70 percent of the country’s patents (Bouey, 2020). In Africa, SMEs account for up 
to 90 percent of all businesses (Patel et al., 2020).  
Key economic lessons from the Ebola crisis include the importance of stabilising jobs 
and livelihoods and support for SME development as a crucial pathway to economic 
recovery (Guinea, 2014). This can be achieved through strengthening the capacity of 
microfinance institutions, vocational training, socioeconomic rehabilitation, and grants to 
revitalise new and existing enterprises (Guinea, 2014).  
Several countries in Southeast Asia launched new programmes during the East Asian 
crisis aimed at creating jobs through enterprise development, but their reach did not 
extend to the most vulnerable (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). These new programmes were in 
addition to pre-existing programmes to support self-employment and the development of small 
enterprises, focused on credit and technical support services. Malaysia launched funds for small-
scale entrepreneurs in 1998, for example, aimed at creating self-employment opportunities, and 
for small and medium-sized industries. Thailand also introduced some small programmes to 
promote self-employment and the government and some commercial banks introduced credit 
programmes for SMEs in 1999 (Betcherman and Islam, 2001).  Similarly, the Indonesian 
government requires commercial banks to set aside a percentage of their loans for small 
borrowers. Various government programmes and cooperatives also offered subsidised credit to 
micro-entrepreneurs and SMEs, particularly famers, transmigrants and women. Despite these 
many programmes, however, the most vulnerable were unable to gain access as most require 
collateral and are thus not available to borrow without assets (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). 
Recommendations during the current COVID-19 crisis include strong support for 
employment to facilitate the recovery process. SMEs and the self-employed will be 
particularly affected by the various disruptions (ILO, 2020).  In response to uncertainty and 
fear, enterprises are likely to delay investments, purchases of goods and the hiring of workers 
(ILO, 2020). Priorities should include supporting firms through financial relief, such as tax relief, 
subsidies and refinancing, to avoid bankruptcy and, in turn, permanent damage to the economy 
(Blanchard, 2020). Salary supplements can help to ensure that workers can remain employed 
and collect their wages (Gourinchas, 2020; UNDP, 2020). Exemptions from (or support to) social 
contribution payments can be made contingent on a commitment to maintain employment 
(UNDP, 2020).  
Support to SMEs that facilitates the maintenance of employment can contribute to longer-
term economic recovery through lower turnover costs and less decline in aggregate 
demand. Firms that are able to keep existing employees and not have to hire and train new 
employees when the economy recovers, will be able to recover faster with less turnover costs 
(Stephens, 2017). Losing employees also destroys the specific human capital gains achieved on 
the job that benefits the firm and the worker (Paci et al., 2010) (For further discussion, see the 
section on support to larger companies). Such measures to support SME employment, alongside 
support to the liquidity of SMEs and/or cash transfers to businesses and wage subsidies could 
dampen the amplification loops of bankruptcies or reduction in operations, employment loss, and 
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declines in consumer spending and aggregate demand (Gaspar and Mauro 2020; Gourinchas, 
2020). This in turn can greatly reduce the economic downturn (Gourinchas, 2020).  
A precise segmentation of ownership of SMEs will allow for more responsive support. 
Gender responsive fiscal policy, for example, enables identification of SMEs that are owned by 
women in order to ensure that support efforts respond to their specific needs (UNDP, 2020). 
Resources and supports could potentially be deployed through organisations with established 
local networks of SMEs in developing countries, such as the National Small Business Chamber, 
a non-profit membership organisation of 127,000 SMEs in Africa (Patel et al., 2020). 
Many governments in lower- and middle-income countries have already implemented or 
are considering policy options to support SMEs during the COVID-19 crisis, aimed at 
protecting workers in the workplace, stimulating the economy and labour demand, and 
supporting employment and income (ILO, 2020; Patel et al., 2020). South Korea, for example, 
has introduced wage subsidies and tax breaks for small merchants (Gopinath, 2020; ILO, 2020).  
China, the furthest along in the post-COVID-19 outbreak and recovery process, can be 
looked to for lessons, particularly in the case of SMEs. They are the engines of the economy 
and the primary source of the country’s economic growth - and have been more severely 
affected by the epidemic. (Bouey, 2020; Huang et al., 2020). A survey conducted by researchers 
from Tsinghua University of 995 SMEs in February found that the income of 30 percent of the 
companies has dropped by over 50 percent; and over one-third of the companies reported that 
they could stay open for only one month with current cash flow, 33 percent could sustain two 
months, and less than 10 percent could stay open for more than six months (Bouey, 2020). Most 
of the financial pressure (62.8 percent) is from paying salaries and employee insurance and 
social security, followed by rent and loan payments (Bouey, 2020). The possibility of large-scale 
closures of SMEs and an increased unemployment rate would in turn further suppress demand 
and investor confidence (Bouey, 2020).   
Measures to support SMEs in China are considered to be crucial to boosting domestic 
demand, the production networks and the global value chain – thus helping to safeguard 
the stable development of the economy as a whole (Huang et al., 2020). The central and 
local governments in China have since February adopted a series of measures to mitigate the 
pressures on SMEs. These include temporarily deferring and waiving social security 
contributions and certain taxes, exemptions on some rent payments, loan extensions, small-
business lending and interest rate reductions and subsidy increases (Bouey, 2020; Gopinath, 
2020; Huang et al., 2020; ILO, 2020). In some cities, enterprises that did not lay off employees 
could benefit from deduction of social insurance payments and subsidies for employee on-the-job 
training (Huang et al., 2020). SMEs have high expectations of substantial government support, 
including tax relief and subsidies (see Table 1). 
See Figure 2: Expectations of government support due to coronavirus shocks, Source: 
Huang et al., 2020, p. 86, https://voxeu.org/content/mitigating-covid-economic-crisis-act-fast-and-
do-whatever-it-takes  
Despite these efforts to provide support to SMEs in China, enterprises still face struggles 
to meet the COVID-19 prevention requirements from the local government agencies 
necessary to reopen (Bouey, 2020). Some local governments have also pushed the burden of 
COVID-19 prevention entirely on businesses. If one COVID-19 case cluster shows up in a 
business, the business will be closed for a longer period. Further, due to continued, widespread 
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low market demand, many small businesses have found that reopening only means they are 
required to pay rent and salaries without revenue (Bouey, 2020). 
Digital technologies may provide some targeted credit support to struggling SMEs. 
Research has shown that fintech applications (e.g. e-commerce finance platforms and supply 
chain finance platforms) can significantly reduce the operational volatility and improve the 
survival rate of SMEs (see Huang et al., 2020). Compared with traditional commercial bank 
loans, internet fintech platform have several advantages, including: relatively complete credit 
rating systems specifically for SMEs through the use of big data; real-time monitoring of debtors; 
and lending practices that are free from geographic restrictions allowing SME credit on a larger 
scale (Huang et al., 2020). Further, in the specific context of COVID-19, the ability to complete 
credit transactions remotely online contributes to prevention and control of the epidemic (Huang 
et al., 2020). It is thus recommended that internet fintech platforms are currently leveraged to 
provide loans to SMEs (Huang et al., 2020).  The digital company, Alibaba Group, is leveraging 
its technology and experience of operating during the earlier SARs epidemic to support SMEs 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, working with other financial institutions in China to provide 
financial support to around 10 million micro-and-small enterprises around the country. They aim 
to assist with the resumption of work and production, and efforts to expand production. Specific 
measures include interest-free ad low-interest loans to SMEs (Huang et al., 2020). 
Specific measures have also been extended during prior crises to self-employed workers, 
who are also more likely to suffer from economic downturns and disruptions from 
epidemics (Stephens, 2017).  A temporary basic salary offered to those that are self-employed 
for the duration of the epidemic and its subsequent recovery would alleviate the economic 
suffering of many (Stephens, 2017). During the current COVID-19 outbreak, some countries 
have considered extending the logic of social insurance programmes to registered self-employed 
workers. It can be challenging, however, to determine their “usual” earnings level prior to the 
crisis and the reduction in earnings caused by the crisis (Gerard et al., 2020). These challenges 
will likely be greater in developing countries, where there may be less information on self-
employed workers’ past or current earnings. In such contexts, another option would be to make 
unconditional monthly transfers of a fixed amount, such as the Auxilio Emergencial in Brazil, 
which will provide self-employed workers with a monthly payment of 60 percent of the minimum 
wage for the next three months (Gerard et al., 2020). A complementary option is to provide 
emergency low-interest credit lines for self-employed workers, allowing them to borrow a 
maximum amount to pay themselves in the coming months. Such policies have recently been 
recently implemented in some countries, such as in South Africa, to support SMEs pay their 
workers’ wages during the crisis, and could be extended to self-employed workers (Gerard et al., 
2020). Repayment of loans could be made contingent on self-employed workers’ future income 
or gross revenue crossing above a certain threshold, to mitigate concerns of taking on more debt 
(Gerard et al., 2020). 
Offering workforce development training and support to young job seekers, that helps to 
cultivate entrepreneurship, may also contribute to building human capital. It can alleviate 
disruptions in on-the-job human capital accumulation, and contribute to longer-term recovery 
(Patel et al., 2020; Paci et al., 2010).  
Support to larger companies and job retention 
Domestic companies are often hit hardest by epidemics as they do not have the broader 
resources that multinational corporations have to spread their losses over multiple markets 
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and operations (Stephens, 2017). Employees are thus at risk of being laid off during economic 
hardship (Stephens, 2017). Countries with higher income, such as South Korea, were able to 
establish a well-funded economic stimulus package to help domestic companies during the 
MERS outbreak (Stephens, 2017).  
Similar to the case for SMEs, support to larger companies could include benefits that 
enable them to continue to pay their employees in order to ensure that livelihoods are not 
lost in the short- and long-term, and companies can remain competitive (Stephens, 2017). 
International companies could be given special claims in order to encourage them to maintain 
their overseas presence, which is frequently essential to lesser developed country operations, 
particularly in terms of offering significant employment opportunities (Stephens, 2017). During the 
Ebola outbreak, many foreign companies left affected West African countries or retracted 
workers. If incentives had been offered to these companies, they may have made different 
decisions (Stephens, 2017). 
In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, governments in developing countries must intervene to 
provide financial support for distressed companies and encourage firms to not lay off 
workers (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). Similar to provisions being made for SMEs, firms that 
have to pay wages amidst reduction in production (due to inadequate supplies or labour) should 
be offered support, for example in the form of grants and deferral of tax collection. There is a risk 
to tax deferral, however, in that firms that are on the cusp of bankruptcy will also be able to defer 
taxes, leaving shortfalls in future tax collection (Odendahl and Springford, 2020). 
Governments around the world have adopted new job retention schemes amidst the 
epidemic. Such programmes already existed in some countries, for example in Brazil, and could 
be used more widely to protect employment in the formal sector (Gerard et al., 2020).  These 
schemes provide subsidies for temporary reductions in the number of hours worked, replacing a 
share of the earnings forgone by the worker due to the hours not worked, over a maximum 
period of time (Gerard et al., 2020).  In Thailand, for example, a recent job retention scheme 
covers a fixed share of workers’ monthly earnings. In Morocco, a new programme provides a 
fixed monthly amount to workers whose jobs are temporarily suspended. In Brazil and South 
Africa, the amount of forgone earnings received is lower for higher-wage workers. Targeting 
income support to low-wage workers can help more workers for a given budget but requires 
higher-wage workers to make more of an adjustment (Gerard et al., 2020). 
The aim of such schemes in the current crisis is to avoid the destruction of existing jobs, 
which should be viable again once the public health response is relaxed. Subsidizing these 
jobs could allow firms to continue to operate, even if at some reduced level, while sparing 
workers and firms the costs of finding a new job and replacing the worker, speeding up the 
economic recovery (Gerard et al., 2020). Research shows that finding the right workers is a key 
challenge to firm growth in developing countries; and that displaced employees in the formal 
sector take much longer to find a new formal job than in higher-income countries. As such, the 
destruction of existing jobs can have severe longer-term impacts on the size and productivity of 
developing countries’ formal sectors (Gerard et al., 2020). For further discussion, see the SME 
section.  
In many developing countries, worker that are laid off would have no recourse to 
unemployment insurance, making job retention schemes even more essential. In many 
contexts, job retention schemes are also logistically easier than setting up an 
unemployment insurance programme, as governments could use firms as intermediaries to 
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channel the income support to their workers (Gerard et al, 2020).  Even with a job retention 
schemes, many workers will likely be laid off. Developing countries with existing unemployment 
insurance programmes will be better able to support them (Gerard et al., 2020). See the section 
on unemployment insurance benefits.  
While job retention schemes are considered effective interventions to aid in short and 
long-term recovery, tax cuts to businesses may be less desirable. Governments in 
Southeast Asia offered tax cuts to businesses during the global financial crisis to a greater extent 
than tax cuts to support the incomes of the poor.  The latter has a more immediate impact on 
spending and aggregate demand, however, whereas cuts for businesses did not feed so strongly 
or quickly into aggregate demand (Green, 2010). The reason behind such support for companies 
may reflect experience from the East Asian financial crisis in which corporate insolvencies posed 
much of the broad risk to the economy (Green, 2010).  The availability of contingency financing 
for companies, by international facilities, could however provide positive signalling effects on 
markets. This was the case with Indonesia, where such financing contributed to confidence-
building and macroeconomic stability (IBRD, 2010).  
In the case of the current COVID-19 crisis, support to companies in China will also 
influence the status of the global supply chain. Delays in factories returning to full-capacity 
production will continue to affect exports and undermine the global supply chain (Bouey, 2020).  
China’s share of global outputs is extensive in electrical equipment, motor vehicles parts, metals, 
textiles, mineral products and wood products among other output (Bouey, 2020). The Hubei 
Province, for instance, is a hub for the automotive, electrical equipment and ship-building 
sectors. As such, disruptions to the supply chain are inevitable (Bouey, 2020), but the duration 
can be alleviated through job retention and other support schemes.  
Support to specific sectors 
Identifying the particular jobs, sectors or geographic areas through which the economic 
downturn is transmitted is a precondition for effective targeting of policy interventions 
(Paci et al., 2010). While economic analysis of epidemics has often focused on calculating 
reductions for country‐wide GDP, there is evidence that economic activity might not be reduced 
homogenously (Rassy and Smith, 2013). Employment interventions to protect the sectors most 
immediately affected and those most vulnerable may yield relatively higher returns (Paci et al., 
2010). 
In countries where the tourism sector is important, policies should be designed to 
minimise the impact on this vulnerable sector in the event of an epidemic, in order to 
protect it and to minimise spillover effects to the larger economy (Noy and Shields, 2019). 
The prior SARS epidemic resulted in substantial economic losses in the tourism and hospitality 
sectors in China, but these losses were not necessarily inevitable nor unpreventable. The local 
tourism market experienced a relative speedy recovery after SARS. This is attributed in part to 
the existence of crisis management systems established by enterprises prior to the onset of 
SARS, demonstrating the importance of having precautionary systems in place prior to crises 
(Gu and Wall, 2006). The Chinese government also implemented various measures to address 
the consequences of SARS on the tourism industry, including the provision of information, tax 
reductions, subsidies and the expansion of existing and new marketing initiatives (Gu and Wall, 
2006).  A study on the government’s response finds that there is broad agreement that these 
measures had been helpful to tourism enterprises and effective in reducing their costs and 
stimulating the market (Gu and Wall, 2006).  
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Lessons from the H1N1 swine flu outbreak in Mexico also points to the need to engage in 
targeting and preparedness – identifying affected industries that are important to the national 
and regional economy and allocating greater resources to them rather than providing nation-wide 
subsidies (Rassy and Smith, 2013). In addition, mapping the major trade partners and supplying 
markets for the affected industries could also help in anticipating the international response and 
the implications of that response, in order to better plan (Rassy and Smith, 2013). The H1N1 
swine flu pandemic, which emerged in Mexico and the USA in April 2009 took place in the middle 
of the global financial crisis, which by itself had already reduced tourism (Rassy and Smith, 
2013). The repercussions of H1N1 on the tourism and pork sectors coincide with the economic 
losses experienced by Southeast Asian nations following SARS or by the UK after foot and 
mouth disease (FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks (Rassy and 
Smith, 2013).  
To mitigate the economic impact, Mexico adopted a mixed strategy of marketing and 
fiscal support measures (Rassy and Smith, 2013). Lack of formal assessments makes it 
difficult, however, to determine whether fiscal support measures reached the intended recipients 
or whether it helped; and whether marketing campaigns, which entrepreneurs affected by prior 
pandemics preferred, actually contributed to recovery of the tourism sector (Rassy and Smith, 
2013). There is a clear lesson to seek to evaluate such measures in order to inform 
preparedness and subsequent measures to mitigate the economic impact of such outbreaks 
(Rassy and Smith, 2013).  The ability of an industry to recover tends to depend on a combination 
of the ability to restore consumer confidence, substitute availability, and the capacity of the 
industry to organise and respond to the crisis. There is some prior research that demonstrates 
comprehensive, adaptable strategies implemented jointly by producers/suppliers and the 
government are most effective in bringing about recovery (see Rassy and Smith, 2013).  
The COVID-19 crisis has resulted in disruptions to production, initially in Asia, then 
spreading to supply chains across the world. Labour-intensive manufacturing industries 
and service industries have been severely affected due to movement restrictions stemming 
from the outbreak (Huang et al., 2020). While all businesses, regardless of size, are facing 
significant challenges, the aviation, tourism and hospitality industries are particularly affected, 
with a real threat of significant declines in revenue, insolvencies and job losses (ILO, 2020; Mann 
et al., 2020). Retail, entertainment and transport have also been particularly affected by 
disruptions to supply and demand (UNDP, 2020). Support should be strengthened for firms 
operating in the service and manufacturing industries that are experiencing the most severe 
impacts (Huang et al., 2020; UNDP, 2020). 
Longer-term recovery is expected to be tougher in service industries post-COVID 
epidemic, requiring targeted support, unlike in manufacturing industries which are expected to 
rebound quicker (Odendahl and Springford, 2020). In contrast to the aftermath of financial crises, 
when debts proved to be unsustainable and result in a prolonged period of lower consumption, 
manufacturing businesses should recover more easily after epidemics as once businesses 
restock, consumers are likely to make up for forgone spending without delay (Odendahl and 
Springford, 2020). In contrast, it is impossible to make up for forgone social consumption (e.g. 
forgone meals and entertainment), resulting in a longer period of struggle in the services sector. 
As such, interventions will need to be tailored to the different sectors, with some manufacturers 
possibly being able to cope with solely liquidity support, whereas more extensive fiscal support 
will be needed to speed the recovery in services after the worst of the pandemic is over 
(Odendahl and Springford, 2020). 
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Providing support to the most affected sectors will also have the effect of targeting 
support to women, who are often overrepresented in service industries, in particular 
tourism, transport, entertainment, cleaning and remunerated domestic services (ILO; 2020UNDP, 
2020). In Latin America, for example, there are nearly twice as many businesswomen in tourism 
than in any other sector (UNDP, 2020). 
Unemployment insurance benefits 
An important way to mitigate the economic impacts of crises is by maintaining labour-
related income (Paci et al., 2010). When the labour market transmission of shocks occurs 
largely through reduction in formal sector employment, the existence of an effective 
unemployment insurance system (or in countries with low institutional capacity, a public works 
system) can serve as an automatic stabiliser, compensating those who lose their jobs (Khanna et 
al., 2010; Paci et al., 2010). In contrast, when the labour market adjustment occurs through 
earnings or number of hours worked, losses are spread more widely across the workforce. In 
such cases, income maintenance programs (e.g. cash transfers, partial unemployment 
insurance, temporary wage subsidies or income tax credits) are more important (Khanna et al., 
2010). 
Expanding the social insurance system to provide more support to formal employees is 
an important aspect of social protection strategies in developing countries (Gerard et al., 
2020). Formal employees constitute a major employment category in many developing countries, 
particularly in middle-income countries, despite large numbers of workers in the informal sector 
(Gerard et al., 2020). These workers are likely less well prepared than their counterparts in richer 
countries to cope with the economic impact of the crisis. (Gerard et al., 2020). 
Countries that have pre-existing ‘automatic stabilisers’ have greater options during times 
of crisis (Espino, 2013). The introduction or extension of unemployment benefits is an 
option in middle-income countries with good administrative capacity (Paci et al., 2010). An 
extension of the duration of the entitlement may be appropriate, and coverage can be extended 
to previously unprotected groups, such as workers with short employment histories or workers in 
small and medium enterprises (Paci et al., 2010). This was demonstrated by South Korea during 
the East Asian crisis (Paci et al., 2010). When the crisis materialised, none of the affected 
countries, apart from Korea to a small extent, had unemployment insurance schemes or other 
policies in place to help workers cope (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). The Employment 
Insurance System in Korea, which had been established 1995, a couple of years prior to the 
crisis, was initially limited to workers in firms with more than 30 employees. In response to the 
crisis, coverage was extended to firms with fewer than 5 workers, temporary workers employed 
at least 1 month, and part-time workers working more than 18 hours a week. The length of time 
workers could collect benefits also increased. Despite these reforms, only 12 percent of 
unemployed workers were receiving benefits in mid-1999 (Betcherman and Islam, 2001).   
In countries with an unemployment insurance system in place, adjusting benefits to 
compensate workers for a reduction in the number of work hours can also be effective in 
supporting income and allowing employers to retain workers in times of weak demand 
(Khanna et al., 2010; Paci et al., 2010). During the global financial crisis, reduction in earnings in 
middle-income countries was often driven by a reduction in hours worked. In such cases, 
innovative policies that offered workers access to income maintenance mechanisms to 
compensate for temporary reduction in standard working hours (e.g. granting partial 
compensation from the unemployment benefit system on pro-rata basis for the hours lost or 
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providing paid training opportunities) were effective interventions (Khanna et al., 2010). Targeted 
income maintenance programs, in the form of cash transfers to low-paid poor workers, also 
helped to protect the livelihoods of the most vulnerable households from long-term deterioration 
(Khanna et al., 2010).   
The absence of unemployment insurance programmes may reflect large informal sectors. 
In such cases, other income-support programmes are particularly effective to benefit both 
formal and informal sector workers (IEC, 2012). In Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
absence of unemployment insurance benefits, in comparison to countries in Europe and Central 
Asia reflect the large informal sector in LAC (IEC, 2012). Where it was not possible for 
governments and international organisations to provide support to unemployment insurance 
during the global financial crisis, contractions in the labour market were instead mitigated through 
launching or scaling up temporary labour-intensive public works or income-support programmes, 
such as cash transfers (e.g. in El Salvador, Mexico, Latvia and Moldova), which can also benefit 
informal workers (IEG, 2012). For further discussion on support to informal workers, see the 
section on cash transfers. 
The disruptions caused by COVID-19 are expected to result in significant job loss – and 
countries with pre-existing unemployment insurance are considered to be in a better 
shape to support these workers (Gerard et al., 2020). Various countries have expanded 
unemployment benefits. In the Philippines, for example, the Social Security Scheme is prepared 
to pay unemployment benefits to 30,000 to 60,000 workers projected to lose their jobs following 
possible layoffs or business closures (ILO, 2020). For those laid off, unemployment insurance 
could be temporarily enhanced by extending its duration, increasing benefits, or easing the terms 
of eligibility as in the case of prior crises, as has been done in prior crises (Gopinath, 2020).  It 
may be important to relax job search requirements and extend eligibility rules. In South Africa, for 
example, workers are usually eligible for one day of unemployment insurance for every six days 
of employment (Gerard et al., 2020). In Brazil, workers often have to work for at least one year to 
become eligible for any benefits, which could leave laid-off workers who have limited job tenure 
(e.g. less than a year) with little income support throughout this crisis and no other employment 
options in the short run (Gerard et al., 2020). Governments should also consider funding paid 
sick and family leave where it is not among standard benefits, to ensure that unwell workers or 
their caregivers can stay home without fear of losing their jobs during the pandemic (Gopinath, 
2020). Income protection can mitigate the disincentives against disclosing potential infections, 
especially amongst low-income and already disadvantaged groups of workers (ILO, 2020). 
In many developing countries, mandatory severance payments remain more common 
than unemployment benefit schemes, but severance schemes suffer from weaknesses 
that require government support. In the absence of unemployment insurance and other 
income-support measures in East Asia, labour market interventions during crises have focused 
on direct job creation schemes and on severance pay (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). Widely 
used in Southeast Asia, severance pay varied from two to six month’s salary in the affected 
countries at the time of the economic crisis. Enforcement was weak, however, and many 
bankrupt companies failed to meet their obligations, without consequences. Special funds were 
subsequently established in Korea and Thailand to guarantee that severance is paid 
(Betcherman and Islam, 2001). The insurance value of such lump-sum payments is also limited, 
however, when workers cannot find new jobs quickly, and/or firms facing severe reductions in 
cash flow may struggle to pay what they owe their workers (Gerard et al., 2020). During the 
COVID-19 crisis, governments should thus consider providing firms with low-interest loans to 
28 
fund severance pay obligations and/or topping up the severance amount and spreading its 
payment over time (Gerard et al., 2020).  
Cash transfers  
Unconditional cash transfers 
There is strong evidence that unconditional cash transfers during crises can promote 
resilience, contributing to quicker recovery of assets and standards of living for families 
and communities (Patel et al., 2020). If sufficiently generous, unconditional cash transfers have 
been found to be very cost-effective options for protecting the most vulnerable, particularly in 
low-income countries, as they have low administrative costs and do not distort prices. They are 
easier to implement than conditional cash transfers, especially in low institutional capacity 
settings, and can be rolled out more quickly (Paci et al., 2010). 
Demand-side measures to protect workers facing income losses because of infection or 
reduced economic activity are essential to protect affected workers - and to stimulate the 
economy through consumer spending (ILO, 2020).  While they are not specific labour market 
interventions, targeted cash transfers can be an effective method to compensate workers when 
labour market adjustments occur primarily via wage reductions or when there are significant 
numbers of informal workers (Paci et al., 2010). Further, transferring funds to poor people can 
support spending on domestic goods and services, but programmes must engage in effective 
targeting (Green, 2010). During the global financial crisis, unconditional cash transfers provided 
support to the poor in Indonesia. In the first two months of 2009, the programme provided 
support for 18.5 million households (Green, 2010). While social protection programmes do not 
generally play a large part of crisis packages in South East Asia, lessons from Indonesia 
demonstrate that there is capacity to provide meaningful assistance to those most in need 
(Green, 2010). These programmes also encourage aggregate demand, through spending on 
locally produced goods and services that can mitigate the economic downturn (Green, 2010). 
In countries that already have cash transfer and other social protection programmes in 
place, expanding benefits and eligibility will be essential in mitigating the economic and 
social impacts of disruptions from COVID-19 (Patel et al., 2020). Many countries have 
temporarily topped up the amount received by the current beneficiaries of social assistance 
programmes in order to enhance income security and boost aggregate demand (Gerard et al., 
2020).  In Hong Kong, adult residents will receive a one-time cash transfer of $1,280, which is 
expected to boost the economy by 1 per cent (ILO, 2020). In Indonesia, the government has 
increased both the benefit amount and the frequency of its cash transfer programme. It has also 
granted three months of free electricity to 24 million customers with low power connections 
(Gerard et al., 2020). In Kenya, the government has increased the amount of its pension and 
orphan and vulnerable children’s grant (Gerard et al., 2020). 
In developing countries where the informal sector often comprises a large part of the 
economy, cash transfers or other forms of social assistance not tied to formal labour are 
especially important (Gerard et al., 2020). Social insurance programmes, such as 
unemployment insurance benefits or subsidised temporary lay-off schemes, will fail to reach a 
large share of vulnerable households in such contexts (Gerard et al., 2020; Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). South Africa’s child support grant, for example, reaches many poor households 
who are in informal jobs (Gerard et al., 2020). Maintaining and expanding these programmes to 
support informal workers throughout the crisis will provide some minimal support to many 
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affected households (Gerard et al., 2020). They are particularly important as those employed in 
the informal sector are often likely lose their jobs first, in addition to having weak recourse to 
social protection systems (Patel et al., 2020). For further discussion, the section on 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
Cash transfers can provide support not only during the earlier phases of outbreak and 
national lockdowns but also during the recovery phase to restart economic activity (Patel 
et al., 2020). Cash transfer programmes in West Africa, implemented by UN agencies and other 
international organisations, were instrumental for Ebola survivors, orphans and other families of 
persons who died of Ebola. They received disbursements to restart livelihood activities (Guinea, 
2014; Patel et al., 2020). During the global financial crisis, cash transfers were also given to low-
paid poor workers in middle-income countries in order to protect their livelihoods from long-term 
deterioration (Khanna et al., 2010). Cash transfers can thus be important to address the longer-
term economic consequences of pandemics (Patel et al., 2020).  
Conditional Cash transfers 
Conditional cash transfers often serve the dual objective of dampening income shocks 
and promoting investments in human capital, which in turn can contribute to the longer-
term potential of the economy (Green, 2010; Paci et al., 2010). CCT programmes are a 
popular form of income support in some developing countries. Assistance is conditional on a 
particular behaviour encouraged by the state (e.g. enrolling children at school or using health 
facilities) (Gerard et al., 2020). CCTs can thus help channel funds to the most vulnerable while 
nurturing human capital accumulation, which can be beneficial in the long run (Paci et al, 2010). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, CCTs have been the most widespread form of intervention 
during crises since the mid-1990s (Espino, 2013).   
Due to Brazil’s pre-existing large CCT scheme, Bolsa Familia, the country already had in 
place a financing mechanism to respond to the impacts of the Zika epidemic. It became 
one of the few countries to respond to Zika with a specific adapted social protection instrument 
early on, providing support to affected families, to parents of children with microcephaly and 
support to prevention efforts in the form of insecticides for families receiving benefits under Bolsa 
Familia (UNDP, 2017). It is important to address early on caregiver withdrawal from the labour 
force, potentially permanently, and to provide education and livelihood support for those 
negatively impacted by Zika (UNDP, 2017). 
CCTs that require school attendance or the use of health facilities can mitigate against 
declines in human capital, particularly among poorer communities, stemming from 
epidemics and financial crises. Experience from prior financial crises suggests that in even 
short-term crisis-induced reductions in earnings may force households to engage in behaviour 
that is detrimental to their long-run welfare. This can also seriously undermine the quality of 
labour supply in the long term (Paci et al., 2010). Such actions include reducing investments in 
education and other sources of human capital and depleting productive assets (Paci et al., 2010). 
In Indonesia, for example, the East Asian crisis was associated with significant declines in school 
enrolment among the poorest, particularly in rural areas. Poor households may also spend less 
on health and nutrition (Paci et al., 2010). School closures in response to epidemics result in lost 
learning opportunities, but more vulnerable students may not return to the education system, 
translating to lower long-term earning trajectories for them and their families, and reduced overall 
human capital for their economies (Evans and Over, 2020). CCT programmes can help to 
mitigate these impacts. During the global financial crisis, the Philippines, for example, 
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implemented a programme that targeted 700,000 families, helping to meet the health and 
educational needs of children (Green, 2010). 
It is important to monitor the impact of cash transfers in order to ensure that they are 
designed in a way that does not exacerbate inequalities, social divisions and 
marginalisation. A study of gender dimensions of the global financial crisis in Central America, 
for example, finds that CCTs aimed at mitigating the effects of the financial crisis often involved 
men controlling decisions about spending. Transfers should not reproduce the traditional gender 
division of labour and reinforce the role of women as primary caregivers (Espino, 2013). Such 
transfers need to be accompanied by training opportunities, along with support in areas such as 
domestic violence, healthcare, and temporary employment (Espino, 2013). In addition to 
strengthening the labour force participation of women, attention also needs to be paid to 
diversifying beyond the range of jobs typically help by women and to childcare demands (Espino, 
2013). 
While CCTs can in principle improve upon the performance of unconditional cash 
transfers and contribute to longer-term recovery, successful implementation of such 
schemes requires substantial administrative capacity (Paci et al., 2010). This may not be 
possible in some developing countries, particularly in crisis situations where the ability to scale 
programmes up (and subsequently down) quickly and efficiently enables governments to 
respond quickly (Paci et al., 2010). 
In the current COVID-19 crisis, it is recommended that CCT and public works programmes 
are temporarily made unconditional, although removing conditionalities may be legally or 
politically difficult (Gerard et al., 2020). In India, for example, a relief package to increases the 
wage for workers under the rural employment scheme made no provision to make public work 
sites compatible with social distancing (Gerard et al., 2020). Other public works programmes, 
such as Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme already provide food and cash for those 
identified by communities as unable to work. This feature could possibly be extended to all 
programme recipients, removing the condition of providing food and cash against public works 
(Gerard et al., 2020).  
Targeting 
The ability to effectively target vulnerable groups is a key aspect of effective social 
assistance programming (Gerard et al., 2020). Targeted support can be more effective in 
addressing economic dislocation caused by health and economic crises rather than large 
programmes that apply across the board, such as cutting labour taxes (Wyplos, 2020). Different 
targeted programmes provide relief to specific socio-demographic groups, based on 
demographic, occupation and/or economic indicators (e.g. social pensions for the elderly or 
grants for orphans; support to famers and other occupational groups; transfers to households 
deemed poor based on assets) (Gerard et al., 2020). Epidemics and economic crises can have a 
disproportionate impact on certain segments of the population, which exacerbate inequalities 
(ILO, 2020). Experience with prior epidemic outbreaks, such as Ebola, Zika, MERS, SARS and 
H1N1, and current information on COVID-19 reveal that the most vulnerable are 
disproportionately affected by the diseases and by government responses to it (UNDP, 2020). 
They include the elderly, youth, women, people with disabilities, low-income households, 
households highly exposed to shocks, and informal workers without social protection or any kind 
of insurance (ILO, 2020; UNDP, 2020). Developing countries can during crises leverage all their 
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programmes simultaneously to provide assistance to a wide range of vulnerable groups (Gerard 
et al., 2020).  
While transfer programmes may suffer from inclusion errors or corruption and diversion, 
they need to be relied upon in times of emergency even if targeting is not perfect (Gerard 
et al., 2020). Efforts should be made to improve targeting, though. In Southeast Asia, transfer 
programmes to support the poor and near-poor, in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Viet 
Nam, during the global financial crisis were criticised for weak targeting and monitoring (Green, 
2010). 
While permanent CCT programmes are well suited to addressing chronic poverty, there 
are concerns that they may lack the flexibility to protect the near poor and/or transitory 
poor, who also need to be targeted during crises (IEG, 2012). During the global financial 
crisis, governments in LAC scaled up CCTs, with support from international organisations (IEG, 
2012). There are concerns, however, over weaknesses in targeting all those in need (IEG, 2012).  
Experience from previous crises in developing countries suggest that support for 
measuring impacts of crises should be a priority in order to identify populations, 
households and enterprises most in need and to target support to them (Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). During the Ebola epidemic, this was done effectively through low-cost phone 
surveys in Sierra Leone and Liberia, building on a framework to gather just-in-time information on 
the impacts of ill health and economic hardship (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). During the 
COVID-19 crisis, it is also necessary to monitor health and economic situations across and within 
countries in order to mitigate the most urgent needs (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). In South 
Africa, it is recommended that cash transfer programmes are temporarily extended to new 
households, whose information were collected to target these programmes, but who had prior to 
the crisis been deemed ineligible (Gerard et al., 2020).  
Some developing countries have already been taking innovative steps toward 
preparedness and response to the COVID-19 crisis, by identifying those most affected. In 
Colombia, for example, a multi-phased programme is being implemented in the capital to identify 
households that would experience severe income loss under quarantine. This was achieved 
early in the pandemic, through a four-day quarantine simulation (Revenga and Galindo, 2020). 
The local administration gathered data through street and phone polling, among other 
methodologies, which helped with the development of a targeted guaranteed minimum income 
programme for 350,000 households, in collaboration with banks and international NGOs 
(Revenga and Galindo, 2020). The programme aims to support poor or near-poor households 
during the quarantine, with few conditions, to increase the capacity to stay home (Revenga and 
Galindo, 2020). In Peru, a similar programme has been enacted by the central government to 
reach over 3 million households with informal and independent workers (Revenga and Galindo, 
2020). 
Using existing programmes to extend assistance to new beneficiaries requires not only 
information on potential beneficiaries, but also payment infrastructure to reach them 
(Gerard et al., 2020). Some governments, as in Chile and India, have leveraged identity-linked 
bank accounts, established for financial inclusion purposes to provide direct support to the poor. 
Even populations at the margins of social protection systems, such as migrant workers in the 
informal sector who are not registered where they work, can be reached through associations 
that work with them (Gerard et al., 2020). The state of Bihar in India, for example, has 
announced a transfer to all migrant workers stranded in other states and aims to perform identity 
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checks through a phone app (see Gerard et al., 2020). In Brazil, households recorded in the 
Cadastro Unico (the Brazilian census of the poor) will be eligible for the same Auxilio 
Emergencial (emergency assistance programme) as formal self-employed workers, but the 
government has also created a new website to extend coverage to informal workers at large 
(Gerard et al., 2020).  
Relying on digital payment infrastructures is quick and safer in an epidemic, but it may 
exclude vulnerable households, who do not have access to a computer or smartphone. In 
such cases, it would be necessary to set up physical collection points or direct delivery systems 
for these households while still respecting social distancing measures. Otherwise, there is a risk 
that bank branches could become overcrowded, as in Peru, where recipients of Bono Yo Me 
Quedo en Casa programme went to banks to cash their benefits (Gerard et al., 2020). 
Delivery to recipients could be facilitated by involving local governments or non-state 
actors, although there is a risk of resources being diverted by local elites or used for clientelism 
(Gerard et al., 2020). Local structures could be involved in identifying individuals in dire need of 
additional support. In Latin America, censuses of the poor used to target CCT programmes are 
usually updated by local administration (Gerard et al., 2020). In Rwanda, local structures are 
being used to target in-kind food security packages to vulnerable households. There is a toll free 
line for households to report if they have been missed out in the targeting, in order to avoid 
exclusion errors (Gerard et al., 2020). 
The increasing availability of Internet-based tools and mobile phones for tracking fund 
disbursement can increase the effectiveness in the provision of support and prevent 
leakages (Green, 2010). In an emergency, however, the benefits from improving targeting and 
reducing leakages can be less than the costs if an improved process leads to substantial delays 
in implementation (Gerard et al., 2020).  
In-kind transfers 
Policies and programmes designed to assist in the short-term must aim to ensure that 
basic essentials are available (Stephens, 2017). In developing countries, malnutrition is a key 
concern, alongside jobs and economic output (Stephens, 2017). Food security and maintaining 
livelihoods were key priority areas during the Ebola outbreak (Stephens, 2017; Guinea, 2014). 
Similarly, during the COVID-19 crisis, governments in many middle-income countries are working 
to develop short-term support measures to help vulnerable populations meet basic needs in the 
midst of intense disruptions to daily life (Patel et al., 2020). India, for example, announced a $23 
billion aid package, with a focus on helping to feed 800 million of its poorest citizens through 
distribution of wheat, rice, and pulses, and a one-time cash transfer to 30 million senior citizens 
and 200 million poor women over three months (Patel et al., 2020). Many lower-income countries 
may not, however, have the domestic resources to rapidly launch these kinds of supports (Patel 
et al., 2020). International and national NGOs are complementing government efforts in many 
LMICs, providing support to the provision of food and essential hygiene and sanitation products 
(Patel et al., 2020). 
Social assistance programmes may provide cash, in-kind assistance (e.g. food, fuel) or 
subsidised access to essential goods and services (e.g. health services, housing). Where 
supply chains are impacted or prices rise, in-kind provision will be most powerful, and 
public procurement will support producers as well (Gerard et al., 2020). For example, the Indian 
government doubled the monthly food grain (wheat and rice) household allowance and added 
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pulses to the ration provided by the Public Distribution System (Gerard et al., 2020). Where 
households can buy goods and services at reasonable prices, cash transfers are quicker to 
implement and easier to exchange than in-kind transfers (Gerard et al., 2020). 
For further discussion on food security, see the discussion on food exports in the trade and 
investment section). 
Public works programmes 
During the East Asian crisis, public works programmes provided unemployed workers 
with much-needed income, particularly in the absence of unemployment insurance 
schemes (except in Korea) (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). Such programmes included labour-
intensive infrastructure construction programmes and credit schemes to promote self-
employment and enterprise development (Betcherman and Islam, 2001). While some 
programmes were considered to be poorly designed and rushed into operation, once the crisis 
hit, lessons from Indonesia indicate that schemes that involved local communities have 
performed far better than those planned and implemented without such participation 
(Betcherman and Islam, 2001). 
While public works programmes focused on infrastructure investment can be vital for 
long-term potential growth, they often fail to provide effective support to economic 
activity in the short term (Green, 2010). Infrastructure projects as part of public work 
programmes have the potential to provide employment in the short-term and to lay the foundation 
for longer-term economic growth (Paci et al., 2010). During the global financial crisis, fiscal 
stimulus in the form of spending on large infrastructure projects in South East Asia were 
considered wasteful projects, however, that did not contribute quickly to improving aggregate 
demand as many projects were subject to delays (Samphantharak, 2019).  The Philippines did 
experience some success with leveraging an existing active programme of capital expenditure to 
implement small infrastructure programmes (Green, 2010). Infrastructure projects that form part 
of fiscal stimulus, need to be planned in advance and have clear and quick implantation plans, 
which is difficult to ensure (Green, 2010).  
In addition, as observed in Central America during the global financial crisis, women risk 
being underrepresented as beneficiaries of public works programmes as construction is 
traditionally considered a ‘male’ sector (Espino, 2013). There are many tasks related to public 
investment, however, in which there is no objective reason to prefer men over women. Many 
women work for the road maintenance SMEs, for example, and in finishing work on construction 
projects (Espino, 2013).  Public investments in childcare have not been included among 
countercyclical measures, despite their potential in terms of employment generation, contribution 
to recovery, and social protection (Espino, 2013). 
During the current COVID-19 crisis, the conditions of public works programmes cannot be 
fulfilled while schools and public works sites have been closed, but could be a source of 
recovery in the post-outbreak phase (Gerard et al., 2020). As discussed above under 
conditional cash transfers, removing requirements for public works are necessary unless proper 
provisions are made to make sites compatible with social distancing (Gerard et al., 2020). 
Several ministries in China, which has begun the process of restarting its economy in the post-
outbreak phase, have coordinated to effectively expand domestic demand by stimulating 
infrastructure investment (Huang et al., 2020). A number of key projects related to energy, 
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transportation and information technology industries have been launched and financed by special 
local government bonds (Huang et al., 2020). 
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